Sky Harbour

Deed Restrictions & HOA Authority

Homeowner Information Sheet

(Sections 1–11; with added focus on Sections 1–3 standing/succession)

Purpose: This sheet summarizes what the recorded deed restrictions say, what the major disputes are, and what documents matter most in the public record. It is for information and community discussion—not legal advice.

A. The Neighborhood-Wide Anchor (Sections 1–11):

The January 1, 1990 Duration Clause

All eleven sets of Sky Harbour deed restrictions contain the same core duration structure: the restrictions are stated to be binding “until January 1, 1990” and then discuss later action in “successive ten (10) year periods.”

That creates a subdivision-wide threshold question:

Did any section’s restrictions lawfully continue beyond January 1, 1990 by strict compliance with the recorded continuation/change mechanism described in the restrictions, or did they terminate by their own terms on that date?

This is not a “Section 1–3 only” theory. It applies to Sections 1–11 because the duration trigger date and structure are shared across all of them.

B. Why These Restrictions Are Not “Evergreen”

(No automatic renewal by silence)

Many people see “successive ten (10) year periods” and assume automatic renewal. That assumption is not supported by the way these documents are written.

1) A hard stop date is the opposite of evergreen

The restrictions don’t say “for 20 years and then auto-renew every 10 years.” They say they are binding until January 1, 1990—a fixed calendar endpoint. If the intent were perpetual renewal by default, including a specific date like January 1, 1990 would be clunky at best and misleading at worst. Put bluntly:

If it renews forever automatically, “January 1, 1990” has no practical purpose.

2) The mechanism described is affirmative action, not passive renewal

The recorded language describes a procedure where owners meeting a stated threshold can execute and record a written instrument that releases (reduces) restrictions and becomes effective from the date of recording. That is the opposite of “automatic renewal.”

Plain English: These documents are paper-driven. They emphasize recorded instruments and effective dates, not silent auto-extension.

3) The vote language is reduction/release language—not “extension” language

The owner action described is to “release any one or more of the restrictions or conditions.” That is modification downward—not adding burdens and not “extending life.” Extending a covenant regime past a stated termination date adds burden (duration) and normally requires clear “extend/renew/continue” language.

4) Related scheme documents repeat the same “1990 + reduction” logic

A later developer/HOA common-area deed (1975 executed / 1976 recorded) also uses the same architecture—ten-year lock, then owner vote can reduce conditions, and a 1990 endpoint. That consistency supports the idea that 1990 was intended as a real, subdivision-wide end date—not a placeholder in an infinite renewal loop.

C. The Tail Sentence: What “From Such Date” and “Successive Ten-Year Periods” Likely Means

(and what it does NOT mean)

This is the confusing part, and the drafting is clunky. The key phrase is: “from such date.”

1) “Such date” most naturally refers to the recording date of a change/release instrument

Right before the “successive ten-year periods” language, the clause states that any owner-approved release/change instrument becomes effective from the date of recording.

Then it says restrictions affect the lots “from such date.”

In normal legal drafting, “such date” points back to the most recent clearly stated date—here, the recording date of the release/change instrument.

Plain English:

• Owners record a release/change document.

• It becomes effective on its recording date (“such date”).

• From that point, the restrictions (as modified) are treated within a ten-year framework.

2) What the ten-year concept is doing in context

A reasonable, text-faithful reading is that the “ten-year periods” language is describing how the covenant set operates after any recorded modifications: a rolling administrative framework where restrictions (as modified) apply in ten-year blocks subject to further change by the same process.

This interpretation matches the internal cross-reference:
“effective from the date of recording” → “from such date…”

3) What it does NOT clearly say

It does not clearly say:

• “automatically renew,”

• “extend automatically,”

• “continue indefinitely,”

• “renew unless terminated,” or

• “renew every ten years by silence.”

If evergreen renewal were intended, the clause would normally say so plainly.

4) Why this tail language does not logically erase the 1990 hard stop

Even reading the tail sentence broadly, it is difficult to reconcile with a sentence that gives an explicit termination date: January 1, 1990. A “ten-year framework” language does not magically convert a hard stop into a perpetual covenant unless the document explicitly says it overrides the hard stop—which it does not.

5) Simple example (neighbor-friendly)

If owners recorded a release instrument in 1984 removing one restriction:

• That change becomes effective on the recording date (“such date”).

• The restrictions then apply in the modified form from that date forward—but still within a covenant scheme written to terminate on January 1, 1990 unless lawfully continued.

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D. The Shared Framework (All Sections 1–11): Membership/Dues, Lien, and “Two Lanes” Enforcement

Sections 1–11 share the same overall framework:

• Membership / Association concept (as written in the original instruments)

• Dues/fees/charges for maintenance and common benefit purposes

• A covenant lien concept to secure payment of authorized charges

• A “two-lane” enforcement model:

  • Lane 1: General enforcement (injunction/damages to stop violations)

  • Lane 2: Money remedies (collection of charges and foreclosure of the covenant lien), reserved to the named Association (or lawful successor/assign)

Key point: Even where general enforcement is broad, the recorded documents treat collection/foreclosure as a narrower lane tied to the specifically identified “Association” and any lawful successors/assigns.

E. The Big Picture Disputes (All Sections 1–11)

1) Expiration / Duration (Subdivision-wide)

Because all Sections 1–11 reference January 1, 1990, the dispute is whether the restrictions:

• expired automatically on that date, or

• were validly continued by strict compliance with the instrument’s stated mechanism (written instrument, correct threshold, executed/acknowledged/recorded, etc.).

2) “Recorded authority” vs internal documents (Subdivision-wide)

Bylaws are internal corporate governance rules. They do not automatically become land-use authority unless the recorded covenants incorporate them in a way that satisfies Texas law. The dispute is whether the HOA relies on internal documents (or “custom and practice”) where recorded authority is missing or expired.

3) Who can enforce what (Subdivision-wide)

Most restriction schemes distinguish:

• General enforcement (injunction/damages) vs

• Money remedies (dues/assessments, liens, foreclosure)

Even if a section allows injunction-type enforcement, money remedies typically require clear, express recorded authority, and they rise and fall with (a) the continued existence of the restrictions and (b) the claimant’s identity as the lawful party to invoke the money-remedy lane.

4) Entity identity and “successor/assign” proof (Varies by section)

Where a restriction names a particular association or developer, a different modern entity generally must show it is a lawful successor or assignee of the covenant rights by recorded instruments (not assumptions).

5) Sections 1–3: 1971 “Name Change Only” Amendment (Standing/Succession Flag)

Recorded history for Sections 1–3 includes a 1971 amendment that changes the section/addition names (Laguna Tres North Section One/Two/Three → Sky Harbour Section One/Two/Three) and states that except as amended the dedication remains in full force. The amendment appears to address naming of the additions only and does not purport to substitute or rename the “Association” entity identified in the original dedication.

Practical impact: if the named Association in the original recorded instruments remained the same, then any later entity claiming today’s collection/lien/foreclosure authority in Sections 1–3 must be able to point to a specific recorded instrument (by clerk instrument number/book-page) that lawfully transferred or substituted those covenant rights to the modern HOA.

Key question homeowners can ask:
Where is the recorded instrument that (a) substitutes the Association entity for Sections 1–3, and (b) transfers the “money remedies” lane (collection/lien/foreclosure) to the modern HOA?

F. What’s Distinct About Sections 1–3:

The “Named Association” Standing/Succession Issue (Plus the 1971 Amendment)

Sections 1–11 share the same framework and the same January 1, 1990 duration structure. The distinguishing issue in Sections 1–3 is not that they have lien language (they do) or a two-lane enforcement model (they do) — it’s that the recorded documents identify a different named Association than the current Sky Harbour HOA, and the known pre-1990 amendment affecting Sections 1–3 (1971) appears to change only the section/addition names—not the Association entity.

In other words:

• The recorded instrument’s “Association heretofore referred to” is tied to the association named in the document, and

• A modern HOA that is not the named entity must prove it is the lawful successor/assignee to invoke the collection/foreclosure lane.

• The 1971 amendment appears to rename the sections while stating the dedication otherwise remains in force, without clearly changing the Association name.

 

Summary: In Sections 1–3, there is an extra “standing” hurdle: the modern HOA must show recorded proof that it lawfully became the successor/assignee to the named Association’s money-remedy rights—on top of the subdivision-wide “did the restrictions survive 1990?” question.

G. About the 1975–76 Property Transfer Document

(Why it may not prove covenant control)

A deed or transfer document where Sky Enterprises conveys physical property (clubhouse/parks/etc.) to another entity can show ownership of land improvements—but it does not automatically prove:

• continuation of covenants beyond January 1, 1990, or

• assignment/succession of covenant enforcement/collection powers, or

• substitution of a new “Association” for the one named in the recorded restrictions.

Plain English: Owning the clubhouse is not the same thing as inheriting covenant lien and foreclosure rights. The key question is what the recorded covenants authorize and whether those rights were lawfully assigned/continued by recorded instruments.

(Also important: the 1975/76 deed’s use of the same 1990 endpoint and reduction mechanism is consistent with the idea that the development scheme was drafted with a real termination date, not an evergreen renewal model.)

 

 

H. A Recorded Lien Was Filed in 2025

(Why this is urgent)

A Notice of Assessment Lien was recorded in Hood County against at least one property, citing the 1970 Declaration “including any amendments.”

Homeowners should understand:

• liens can cloud title (sale/refinance/insurance), and

• lien validity depends on recorded covenant authority, duration/continuation, and the identity/succession chain for the party asserting the money-remedy lane.

Practical tip: Any homeowner can search Hood County Official Public Records by name/address to see whether a lien has been recorded.

I. Management Certificate / Public Disclosure Mismatch (Transparency issue)

A Management Certificate recorded in Hood County on 11/07/2023 (Doc. No. 2023-0014659) lists a prior management company (Goodwin & Company) as the designated representative/manager contact.

If the HOA is currently using a different management company, homeowners may ask:

• Has an updated management certificate been recorded?

• If not, why is the public disclosure still listing the prior manager?

This does not decide covenant authority by itself, but it is relevant to transparency and the reasonableness of aggressive collection activity.

J. “What to Ask For”

(Recorded-Document Checklist for Any Section)

If the HOA claims it has valid assessment/lien/foreclosure authority today, homeowners can ask it to identify, by recorded instrument number:

• For each section (1–11): the recorded document that continued restrictions beyond January 1, 1990, if any.

• Any recorded basis for assessments/dues, including where the obligation is created and how amounts are calculated.

• Any recorded basis for lien authority, including where the lien is created and how it can be enforced.

• The current recorded Management Certificate identifying the current manager/designated representative.

• For Sections 1–3 specifically: recorded proof that the modern HOA is the lawful successor/assignee to the named Association for the collection/foreclosure lane described in the recorded instrument.

Summary

Sections 1–11 share the same framework: membership/dues, a covenant lien concept, and a “two-lane” enforcement model (general enforcement vs. collection/foreclosure reserved to the named Association or lawful successor/assign), plus the same January 1, 1990 duration structure. The subdivision-wide question is whether each section’s restrictions were lawfully continued beyond that date by recorded instruments.

The “successive ten-year periods” language does not clearly create automatic renewal—especially when the same paragraph anchors the scheme to a hard termination date and ties “such date” to the recording date of owner action.

Sections 1–3 add an extra problem: the named Association in the recorded documents is not the current HOA, and the known 1971 amendment appears to rename the sections while leaving the dedication otherwise in force without clearly changing the Association name. Any modern HOA asserting today’s collection/foreclosure lane in Sections 1–3 must therefore prove recorded successor/assignment authority in addition to proving valid continuation beyond 1990.

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WHY THIS MATTERS

(READ THIS BEFORE YOU PAY A DIME)

This isn’t “neighborhood drama.” This is about money, title, and leverage. When an organization claims the right to charge you, fine you, and lien your home, the only thing that makes that legal is valid recorded authority. Not bylaws. Not “that’s how we’ve always done it.” Not intimidation. Recorded instruments.

1) Liens aren’t a “letter.” They’re a weapon.

A recorded lien can:

• cloud your title (sell/refi/HELOC problems),

• spook lenders and title companies,

• create stress and urgency where none should exist,

• force you to hire counsel just to clear paperwork you didn’t create.

If the underlying authority is expired or not properly continued, then filing liens anyway is not “administration.” It’s manufacturing leverage.

2) Elderly and fixed-income homeowners get targeted hardest—because the pressure works.

If you’re on a fixed income, the “pay now or else” tactic hits like a panic button:

• fear of foreclosure,

• fear of attorney letters,

• fear of losing the house,

• fear of debt collectors calling.

That fear is exactly what turns a questionable claim into cash flow.

If the HOA’s authority is not clean in the records, then the pressure campaign isn’t governance — it’s extraction.

3) Paying “just to make it go away” can be a trap.

Once money changes hands, it’s easier for them to argue:

• you admitted the debt,

• you “recognized” their authority,

• you waived objections,

• you established a “course of dealing.”

Even if that argument isn’t ultimately correct, it’s a stress tax and litigation friction they can weaponize later.

4) “We filed something” is not the same as “we have the right.”

In the recent filing war, the public record shows:

• homeowners saying “owner signatures are required,”

• the HOA responding with its own filings,

• confusion over whether vote math was by lot count or land area.

That alone proves the point: if this were settled authority, it wouldn’t require a paper war to justify it.

5) The paper trail is the whole game.

When a restriction scheme claims a hard termination date and requires strict, recorded steps for change/continuation:

• the controlling evidence is what’s recorded, not what’s claimed.

• the burden is on the party asserting power to show the recorded chain.

If the HOA is asking you for money while the recorded chain is disputed or missing, that’s not “community maintenance.” That’s collection-first, proof-later.

Bottom line:

If you’re being pressured — especially if you’re elderly or on fixed income — slow down.

A lien or demand letter is designed to make you feel like you’re out of options. You’re not.

Don’t let panic replace proof.
Demand the recorded authority.
And treat any lien threat without clear recorded support as a serious escalation, not a normal bill.

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3/8/2026

S. Gary Werley — Duration Clause Contact Log (Record-Accuracy Note)

Purpose: This section documents a brief, good-faith attempt to obtain a verbatim, sentence-specific explanation supporting a court filing’s paraphrase of the Duration clause.
This is not legal advice and does not take a position on any party’s litigation strategy. It is included to encourage accuracy and transparency when recorded instruments are being quoted to the community or the Court.

What happened (high-level)

• I attempted to send written correspondence to S. Gary Werley, relating only to the Duration clause interpretation (specifically the “until January 1, 1990” hard-stop language and the “such date / successive ten-year periods” tail sentence).

• USPS tracking reflected the mailing was being returned as “addressee unknown” when sent to the publicly listed business address (1840 Acton Hwy, Ste 102, Granbury, TX 76049).

• I emailed him to request a deliverable mailing address. He replied with an alternate address by email (not reproduced here).

• Due to work constraints, I then re-sent the letter by email as an attachment and asked for confirmation of receipt and a verbatim quote-and-pinpoint citation supporting the “after January 1, 1990” paraphrase.

Substantive responses received (paraphrased and/or quoted)

• “The deed restrictions may not be amended for 10 years, after 10 years they may be amended.”

• “Read the last sentence.”

• “You need to hire your own attorney. I am done. It says after the first 10 years continues until modified.”

What was not provided (despite being requested)

• A verbatim quotation of the “last sentence” being relied upon, placed in context with the preceding “effective from date of recording / from such date” language.

• A text-based reconciliation between:

  • the clause stating the covenants are binding “until January 1, 1990,” and

  • any claim that the covenants continue indefinitely “until modified.”

• Identification of any explicit override language (e.g., “automatically renew,” “continue beyond,” “notwithstanding the termination date,” etc.) that would convert a date-certain endpoint into perpetual operation.

Why this matters (practical takeaway)

• If an argument depends on deed restrictions continuing past a stated termination date, homeowners should insist on verbatim, sentence-specific citations to the recorded instrument—not paraphrases—and an explanation of how the cited sentence(s) coexist with the “until January 1, 1990” language.

• Separately, if a professional’s publicly listed mailing address is not deliverable, homeowners should consider using email delivery plus proof of transmission (and/or verified alternate delivery methods) when trying to ensure receipt of time-sensitive correspondence.

(This log is included strictly as a record-accuracy note and to encourage text-faithful quoting of recorded instruments.)

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